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RECENT DECISIONS
present decision. In that case, an employee watching a baseball game on the
employer's property during the lunch hour was injured by a swinging bat. The
game was not sponsored by the employer but he allowed recreational activity to
take place during the lunch hour. The Lieteran case, though generally agreeing
with the Michigan theory that the injury must have occurred while the employee
was actively engaged in the employer's business to be compensable, can be dis-
tinguished from the instant case in that watching a baseball game at the time of
the injury is quite remote from the employer's service as compared with walking
on the employer's driveway on the way to lunch, especially since the game was
not sponsored by the employer and the cafeteria was so sponsored. The court
did not think this difference was sufficient to draw the line between an activity
falling within the course of employment and one which did not. But, by not so
distinguishing, Michigan comes squarely in conflict with the general rule in the
country.
Though the application of workmen's compensation is made easier under
the Michigan interpretation that the employee must be actively engaged in the
employer's business at the time of the injury to be compensable, the justice of
such a position is questionable. Since most states would have awarded compensa-
tion to the plaintiff, it appears that such an injury as she sustained was intended
to come within most workmen's compensation statutes. American Steel Foundries
v. Czapala, 112 Ind. App. 212, 44 N.E.2d 204 (1942); Weiss v. Friedman's Hotel,
37 Erie 237 (1953), aff'd., 176 Pa. Super. 98, 106 A.2d 86 (1954). By strictly
construing the words "in the course of employment" Michigan has apparently
subverted the very purpose of the act-to place the financial burden of industrial
accidents on the employer as an expense of the business which received the
benefits of the injured employee's services and which engendered such accident.
New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
Diane C. Gaylord
Workmen's Compensation: Immoral Activity as Within Scope of Employment
A bank vice president, while on an "all expense paid" business trip in New
York, was burned to death in his hotel room. A woman not his wife but regis-
tered as such also died as a result of the fire in the room. There was evidence of
drinking and it was determined that the conflagration had been caused by careless
smoking although there was no determination as to which of the two occupants
had been actually responsible. Held, (5-2): Death benefits should not have been
denied. Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Commission, - Cal. 2d -, 297 P. 2d
649 (1956).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In California, as in over forty other states, compensation is awarded for
injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." CAL. LABOR CODE
§3600; N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §10. These qualifications are
conjunctive and must be independently applied, the latter to time and place, the
former in reference to casual origin. Ward & Gow v. Krimsky, 259 U. S. 503
(1922); Davis v. Newsweek Magazine, 305 N. Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953).
Thus, though the two phrases are seldom distinguished, Tedesco v. General Elec.
Co., 305 N. Y. 544, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953), it can be said roughly that the most
frequent issue under the "arising out of" clause will concern the nature of the
injury affecting the employee, whereas the "in the course of" question concerns
what the employee was doing at the time of the injury.
As a general rule a commercial traveler is within the course of employment
during the entire period of travel. Harivel v. Hall-Thompson Co., 98 Conn. 753,
120 At. 603 (1923); In re Buck's Estate, 277 App. Div. 126, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 743
(3d Dep't 1950). Injuries to travelling employees resulting from hotel fires are
- compensable since the employment brought the employee in contact with the
risk which in fact caused the injury and it is irrelevant that there might be no
greater risk to the employee within his own home. Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332,
55 N.E.2d 611 (1942); Blake v. Grand Union Co., 277 App. Div. 914, 98
N. Y. S. 2d 738 (3d Dep't 1950), leave to appeal denied, 301 N. Y. 843, 95
N.E.2d 57 (1950). Injuries caused by careless smoking are compensable since
smoking is so common as to be considered an ordinary and necessary incident of
the employment, such as walking and going to the bathroom. Puffin v. General
Elec. Co., 132 Conn. 279, 43 A.2d 746 (1945), Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 178 Cal. 505, 173 P. 1105 (1918); Chludziwski
v. Standard Oil Co., 176 App. Div. 87, 162 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1916). Other
personal acts, such as bathing or dressing, even though incidental to the employ-
ment, are held to be too remote to be considered a risk which industry must bear,
Davidson v. Parsy Waste Co., 240 N. Y. 584, 148 N. E. 715 (1925); contra
where the injured was a domestic worker: Martin v. Plaut, 293 N. Y. 617, 59
N.E.2d 429 (1944); Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 37 CaL App. 2d 567, 99 P. 2d 1089 (1940).
The majority in the instant case found that the employee was necessarily
within the course of employment since neither illegality, Breimhorst v. Beckman,
227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949), nor the presence of a companion for an
immoral purpose, State Employee's Retirement System v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 97 Cal. App.2d 380, 217 P. 2d 992 (1950), remove it therefrom so
long as the employment is being concurrently attended to. The dissent argued that
the activity of the deceased could reasonably have been found by the finders of
fact, the respondent Commission, not to be that "reasonably contemplated by the
employment."
RECENT DECISIONS
The dissent's formula would seem to be the better rule of law and one more
conformable with the general view. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Ahern, 119
Ohio 41, 162 N. E. 272 (1928); Schneider v. United Whelan Drug Stores, 284
App. Div. 1072, 135 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d Dep't 1954). All activity cannot be
deemed a community or a business risk but neither is it practicable to attempt to
catch all possible fact situations within one net of law. The better rule would seem
to be a reasonable man test, Lewis v. Knappen Tippetts Abbett Engl. Co., 304
N. Y. 461, 108 N.E.2d 609 (1952), or, as stated in Masse v. Robinson Co., 301
N. Y. 34, 37, 92 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1950), compensable activity should be limited
to that which the "man on the street" would associate with the employment.
Richard 0. Robinson
Dismissal of State Employee Without Hearing Upon His Claiming Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Held Illegal
Petitioner, a professor in a city college, was dismissed summarily pursuant
to a city charter provision which provided in effect that a city employee who
utilized the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer questions of
a duly authorized legislative committee would be discharged from such employ-
ment. N. Y. CITY CHARTER §903 (1936). The state interpreted the statute to
mean that invocation of the privilege without more was equivalent to a resigna-
tion. Daniman v. Board of Education of City of N. Y., 306 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E.
2d 373 (1954). On petitioner's proceeding to annul his dismissal, held (5-4):
the statute as interpreted and applied was violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "due process" dause as being arbitrary and patently discriminatory. Slo-
chower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956).
While a state has broad powers in selection and discharge of its employees,
Adler v. Board of Education of City of N. Y., 342 U. S. 485 (1951); Garner v.
Board of Public Works, 341 U. S' 716 (1950), the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment extends to such public servants when exdusion from pubic employ-
ment is pursuant to a statute. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). It is
well established that there is no precise definition of the requirements of due pro-
cess; however, one requirement is that a judicial action not be patently arbitrary
or discriminatory. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Huwtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884). If the invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination should not in and of itself produce a stigma upon the claimant's
character, then the requirements of due process will not have been met under
a summary dismissal, for both the innocent and guilty will be dismissed without
a fair hearing to determine guilt.
